chore(scaffold): initial SilverMetal program scaffold

Cross-platform privacy-hardening program. Two-layer product:
- SilverLABS Application Stack (cross-platform spine)
- Platform Hardening Profiles (per-OS, tier-honest)

Platforms: Linux (Debian/Kicksecure), Android (Pixel/Samsung/Moto/generic),
Windows (LTSC IoT), macOS (profile), iOS (MDM profile). Each flavour has
both a preflashed hardware SKU path and a self-apply "harden your existing
device" path.

Includes umbrella docs (README + threat-model, design-principles,
platform-matrix, roadmap, trust-model), per-platform and per-stack-
component README stubs, .gitignore, LICENSE.

Linux v1 ships first; Stack v1 = Browser + VPN + Sync.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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# SilverMetal Linux
**Status**: Phase 1 (planning) → moving to milestone 1.1 (reproducible Kicksecure fork build)
The reference SilverMetal flavour. Tier A — full kernel-level hardening, verified boot we control, Debian/Kicksecure-based.
## Scope (v1)
See [`../docs/roadmap.md`](../docs/roadmap.md) Phase 1.
### Hardening must-haves
- Kicksecure base (Debian-derived, hardened upstream)
- linux-hardened kernel + KSPP sysctl/build flags
- Secure Boot with our shim/MOK
- TPM2 PCR-bound LUKS2 unlock (Argon2id), full-disk encryption mandatory
- AppArmor strict profiles for browsers, mail, viewers, networked daemons
- GrapheneOS hardened_malloc as system allocator
- bubblewrap + Flatpak primary; firejail for legacy `.deb`
- nftables default-deny inbound, encrypted DNS, SilverVPN always-on default
- Zero upstream telemetry — verified by integration test
- SilverBrowser default (ungoogled-chromium-rebranded v1)
- A/B updates with rollback, signed by our keys
- Optional amnesic session mode
### Out of scope (v1)
- Atomic / immutable root (v1.1 — `ostree` experiment)
- dm-verity on `/` (v1.1)
- ARM64 / Apple Silicon (v2)
- Tor-by-default variant (sibling product later)
## Directory layout
```
linux/
├── build/ # live-build pipeline, reproducible-build config
├── kernel/ # config fragments, linux-hardened pinning
├── overlay/ # /etc + /usr/share/silvermetal + skel hardening overlay
├── packages/
│ ├── include.list # what's installed
│ └── exclude.list # what's purged (snap, telemetry, etc.)
├── apparmor/ # custom strict profiles
├── nftables/ # default ruleset
├── installer/ # Calamares branding + hardened defaults
├── update-server/ # signing + repo hosting (infra-as-code)
└── tests/
├── lynis-baseline/
├── kspp-check/
└── telemetry-leak/
```
## Verification gates (must pass before public alpha)
- Two clean builds from same commit → identical SHA256
- `kconfig-hardened-check` passes
- Lynis hardening score ≥ 90
- 30-min idle telemetry capture: zero packets to MS/Google/Apple/Mozilla/Canonical/Debian/analytics
- TPM tamper test: LUKS correctly falls back to passphrase
- AppArmor: every networked binary confined or documented
- Independent privacy-engineering review
## Upstream we depend on
- **Kicksecure** — fork base
- **linux-hardened** — kernel patchset
- **GrapheneOS hardened_malloc** — allocator
- **KSPP** — kernel config authority
- **secureblue** — reference for v1.1 immutable design