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Build SilverMetal Linux ISO (reproducibility-gated) / build-and-verify (push) Failing after 15m34s
Run #4258 cleared the systemctl shim only to die two seconds later on the *next* expectation derivative-maker has of a real systemd host: its sources.list points at http://127.0.0.1:9977/debian (the approx package-cache socket-activated by systemd) and apt-get update could not reach the daemon because nothing was actually started by the no-op shim: Err:1 http://127.0.0.1:9977/debian trixie InRelease Could not connect to 127.0.0.1:9977 (127.0.0.1). - connect (111: Connection refused) Whack-a-mole'ing each service derivative-maker tries to start (approx today, then journald, then systemd-logind, then who-knows-what tomorrow) is going to keep failing for a while — derivative-maker is fundamentally designed for a real systemd-managed Debian host. The container pattern upstream itself ships (linux/build/derivative-maker/docker/) runs systemd as PID 1 inside the container; this commit adopts that approach. Architecture: - PID 1 in the build container is now systemd. Upstream's vendored entrypoint.sh records the user-supplied command into /etc/docker-entrypoint-cmd, captures env into /etc/docker-entrypoint-env, masks irrelevant units, and execs systemd. systemd boots, docker-entrypoint.service runs the command, docker-entrypoint-stop.sh propagates the exit code via `systemctl exit <code>` so the container exits with the right status. - The four entrypoint files (entrypoint.sh, docker-entrypoint.service / .target, docker-entrypoint-stop.sh) are vendored at linux/build/docker/systemd-entrypoint/ rather than COPY'd from the submodule path — Docker build context can only reach below itself, and bumping is tracked in that dir's README. - Container runtime now requires --cgroupns=host, --tmpfs /run, --tmpfs /run/lock, and -v /sys/fs/cgroup:/sys/fs/cgroup:rw so systemd can manage cgroups properly. -t allocates a TTY, satisfying entrypoint.sh's `[ ! -t 0 ] && exit 1` check in CI where stdin is otherwise /dev/null. - User renamed builder → user (uid 1000, passwordless sudo) to match upstream's USER=user / HOME=/home/user convention. chown in build.sh now uses uid 1000:1000 so it's name-agnostic. - Image package list grew to match upstream's derivative-maker-docker-setup (sq stack + dbus + approx + the rest) plus our ISO toolchain (live-build / debootstrap / xorriso / squashfs-tools / etc.). Snapshot.debian.org pinning is preserved (same APT_SNAPSHOT_URL, two-phase install pattern). Verified: Smoke test on 10.0.0.51 — `docker run --rm --privileged --cgroupns=host --tmpfs /run --tmpfs /run/lock -v /sys/fs/cgroup:...:rw -t <image> /bin/bash -c 'echo OK'` — booted systemd, ran the command via docker-entrypoint.service, captured the output, shut down filesystems and exited cleanly. build.sh BUILDER_IMAGE pin → sha256:dc9dd29d…8811. Image rebuilt natively on 10.0.0.51, pushed to docker-registry.silverlabs.uk. The systemctl shim is removed by virtue of the Dockerfile rewrite — real systemd makes it unnecessary. The previous "iter6 / iter7" intermediate digests stay in the registry until we GC; the live one is m1.1-iter8-systemd. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SilverMetal OS — Linux
Status: Phase 1 (planning) → moving to milestone 1.1 (reproducible Kicksecure fork build)
🔒 SilverMetal OS product line — we ship the operating system.
The reference SilverMetal flavour. Tier A — full kernel-level hardening, verified boot we control, Debian/Kicksecure-based.
Scope (v1)
See ../docs/roadmap.md Phase 1.
Hardening must-haves
- Kicksecure base (Debian-derived, hardened upstream)
- linux-hardened kernel + KSPP sysctl/build flags
- Secure Boot with our shim/MOK
- TPM2 PCR-bound LUKS2 unlock (Argon2id), full-disk encryption mandatory
- AppArmor strict profiles for browsers, mail, viewers, networked daemons
- GrapheneOS hardened_malloc as system allocator
- bubblewrap + Flatpak primary; firejail for legacy
.deb - nftables default-deny inbound, encrypted DNS, SilverVPN always-on default
- Zero upstream telemetry — verified by integration test
- SilverBrowser default (ungoogled-chromium-rebranded v1)
- SilverVPN integrated from existing
SilverLABS/SilverVPN(Linux client + tunnel service) - SilverSync v1 (Nextcloud-backed, client-side encryption)
- A/B updates with rollback, signed by our keys
- Optional amnesic session mode
Out of scope (v1)
- Atomic / immutable root (v1.1 —
ostreeexperiment) - dm-verity on
/(v1.1) - ARM64 / Apple Silicon (v2)
- Tor-by-default variant (sibling product later)
Directory layout
linux/
├── build/ # live-build pipeline, reproducible-build config
├── kernel/ # config fragments, linux-hardened pinning
├── overlay/ # /etc + /usr/share/silvermetal + skel hardening overlay
├── packages/
│ ├── include.list # what's installed
│ └── exclude.list # what's purged (snap, telemetry, etc.)
├── apparmor/ # custom strict profiles
├── nftables/ # default ruleset
├── installer/ # Calamares branding + hardened defaults
├── update-server/ # signing + repo hosting (infra-as-code)
└── tests/
├── lynis-baseline/
├── kspp-check/
└── telemetry-leak/
Verification gates (must pass before public alpha)
- Two clean builds from same commit → identical SHA256
kconfig-hardened-checkpasses- Lynis hardening score ≥ 90
- 30-min idle telemetry capture: zero packets to MS/Google/Apple/Mozilla/Canonical/Debian/analytics
- TPM tamper test: LUKS correctly falls back to passphrase
- AppArmor: every networked binary confined or documented
- Independent privacy-engineering review
Upstream we depend on
- Kicksecure — fork base
- linux-hardened — kernel patchset
- GrapheneOS hardened_malloc — allocator
- KSPP — kernel config authority
- secureblue — reference for v1.1 immutable design
SilverLABS/SilverVPN— VPN client + tunnel service (existing, integrated)