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Build SilverMetal Linux ISO (reproducibility-gated) / build-and-verify (push) Failing after 11m33s
Run #4260 cleared every harness layer and ran for 18 minutes — past sanity-tests, prepare-build-machine, cowbuilder-setup, local-deps — into 2100_create-debian-packages, where it died on: Could not check validity of signature with '92978A6E195E4921825F7FF0F34F09744E9F5DD9' in '/home/user/derivative-binary/temp_packages_debian_sid/virtualbox_7.2.8-dfsg-1.dsc' as public key missing! …and then *also* hung the runner indefinitely because, on any error, derivative-maker's exception_handler_general detected a TTY (we passed `docker run -t`) and dropped into an interactive `read -p 'Answer? '` prompt that nothing was ever going to answer. The orphan docker run in turn orphaned the act_runner job container, blocking the runner until manual cleanup. Three coordinated fixes, validated end-to-end with docker-side smoke tests on 10.0.0.51: 1. **Non-interactive mode without losing output visibility.** The original architectural goal: keep derivative-maker out of interactive mode (`[ -t 0 ]` must be false) AND keep the build log visible to docker run / Gitea Actions (PTY needed somewhere). Resolution: - `docker run -t` is kept (required for /dev/console to be a real PTY back to docker), but no `-i`, so fd 0 stays /dev/null. - docker-entrypoint.service: `StandardInput=tty-force` → `StandardInput=null` so the service's fd 0 is /dev/null too. Verified inside the container: `[ -t 0 ]` returns false. - entrypoint.sh now wraps the user command with an explicit `> /dev/console 2>&1` redirect before writing it to /etc/docker-entrypoint-cmd. systemd's `StandardOutput=inherit` does NOT propagate PID-1's stdout to services in this PID-1- systemd-in-container topology — the service log was going nowhere visible. /dev/console under `docker run -t` IS the allocated PTY back to docker, so the redirect surfaces the log to the act_runner / Gitea Actions log. - entrypoint.sh's `[ ! -t 0 ] && exit 1` guard removed (it would now always trigger). 2. **debian-keyring for reprepro source-package signature checks.** 2100_create-debian-packages calls dm-reprepro-wrapper includedsc on every .dsc in temp_packages_debian_sid (including virtualbox_*.dsc, even for `--target iso` — see line 114 of that build step). reprepro verifies the dsc signature against the user's GPG keyring; without the maintainer keys it fails. Adds `debian-keyring` to Dockerfile.builder. build-inner.sh now imports debian-keyring.gpg / debian-maintainers.gpg / debian-nonupload.gpg into the user's keyring before running derivative-maker. 3. **BUILDER_IMAGE digest re-pinned.** Built natively on 10.0.0.51 (per memory: never on WSL/aarch64). New digest: sha256:2f680c96…f0db. Smoke-test results (against this exact image): ==> START ← user output reaches docker stdout (keyring present) ← debian-keyring imported successfully STDIN_NOT_TTY ← derivative-maker WILL stay non-interactive ==> END ← clean shutdown docker run exit: 42 ← exit code propagates correctly on failure Files: Dockerfile.builder, systemd-entrypoint/entrypoint.sh, systemd-entrypoint/docker-entrypoint.service, scripts/build.sh, scripts/build-inner.sh. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SilverMetal OS — Linux
Status: Phase 1 (planning) → moving to milestone 1.1 (reproducible Kicksecure fork build)
🔒 SilverMetal OS product line — we ship the operating system.
The reference SilverMetal flavour. Tier A — full kernel-level hardening, verified boot we control, Debian/Kicksecure-based.
Scope (v1)
See ../docs/roadmap.md Phase 1.
Hardening must-haves
- Kicksecure base (Debian-derived, hardened upstream)
- linux-hardened kernel + KSPP sysctl/build flags
- Secure Boot with our shim/MOK
- TPM2 PCR-bound LUKS2 unlock (Argon2id), full-disk encryption mandatory
- AppArmor strict profiles for browsers, mail, viewers, networked daemons
- GrapheneOS hardened_malloc as system allocator
- bubblewrap + Flatpak primary; firejail for legacy
.deb - nftables default-deny inbound, encrypted DNS, SilverVPN always-on default
- Zero upstream telemetry — verified by integration test
- SilverBrowser default (ungoogled-chromium-rebranded v1)
- SilverVPN integrated from existing
SilverLABS/SilverVPN(Linux client + tunnel service) - SilverSync v1 (Nextcloud-backed, client-side encryption)
- A/B updates with rollback, signed by our keys
- Optional amnesic session mode
Out of scope (v1)
- Atomic / immutable root (v1.1 —
ostreeexperiment) - dm-verity on
/(v1.1) - ARM64 / Apple Silicon (v2)
- Tor-by-default variant (sibling product later)
Directory layout
linux/
├── build/ # live-build pipeline, reproducible-build config
├── kernel/ # config fragments, linux-hardened pinning
├── overlay/ # /etc + /usr/share/silvermetal + skel hardening overlay
├── packages/
│ ├── include.list # what's installed
│ └── exclude.list # what's purged (snap, telemetry, etc.)
├── apparmor/ # custom strict profiles
├── nftables/ # default ruleset
├── installer/ # Calamares branding + hardened defaults
├── update-server/ # signing + repo hosting (infra-as-code)
└── tests/
├── lynis-baseline/
├── kspp-check/
└── telemetry-leak/
Verification gates (must pass before public alpha)
- Two clean builds from same commit → identical SHA256
kconfig-hardened-checkpasses- Lynis hardening score ≥ 90
- 30-min idle telemetry capture: zero packets to MS/Google/Apple/Mozilla/Canonical/Debian/analytics
- TPM tamper test: LUKS correctly falls back to passphrase
- AppArmor: every networked binary confined or documented
- Independent privacy-engineering review
Upstream we depend on
- Kicksecure — fork base
- linux-hardened — kernel patchset
- GrapheneOS hardened_malloc — allocator
- KSPP — kernel config authority
- secureblue — reference for v1.1 immutable design
SilverLABS/SilverVPN— VPN client + tunnel service (existing, integrated)