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SilverMetal/linux
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fix(linux/build): explicit -alter_date all on updated squashfs node (M1.1 iter36)
Run #4283's enriched diagnostic gave us a precise, low-level reading
of what's still drifting:

    Hex around first ISO divergence:
      flag=0x0e  →  CREATION + MODIFICATION + ACCESS (Rock Ridge TF, short form)
      CREATION:    `7e 05 08 00 06 2d 00`  (=SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH, both A and B )
      MODIFICATION:
        A=`7e 05 08 00 18 10 00`  → 2026-05-08 00:24:16
        B=`7e 05 08 00 28 14 00`  → 2026-05-08 00:40:20
      ACCESS:
        A=`7e 05 08 00 18 0f 00`  → 2026-05-08 00:24:15
        B=`7e 05 08 00 28 13 00`  → 2026-05-08 00:40:19

The MODIFICATION/ACCESS times match the wall-clock minute when each
build's xorriso -commit fired. So:

  * iter35's `touch -d "@${SDE}" "${new_sqfs}"` did nothing for
    mtime — xorriso doesn't propagate the source file's mtime
    through -update.
  * iter34's `-alter_date_r all "=N" /` updated creation (btime →
    Rock Ridge TF CREATION) but not mtime/atime — possibly because
    -update runs at -commit time and re-stamps the node's a/m
    timestamps with the actual write time, after `-alter_date_r`'s
    in-memory update.

Fix: add an explicit, narrowly-scoped `-alter_date all "=N"
/live/filesystem.squashfs --` AFTER `-update` and BEFORE the global
`-alter_date_r`. Per-file alter_date appears to be the last word
xorriso processes against that specific node.

Keep -alter_date_r all and the full -volume_date c/m/x/f/u/s as
belt-and-suspenders.

If this clears, M1.1 reproducibility gate passes. If not, we'll know
xorriso's `-update` is genuinely stamping at commit time independent
of any in-memory date setting, and the move is to skip -update and
do an mkisofs-style full rewrite from the chroot directly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 01:44:58 +01:00
..

SilverMetal OS — Linux

Status: Phase 1 (planning) → moving to milestone 1.1 (reproducible Kicksecure fork build)

🔒 SilverMetal OS product line — we ship the operating system.

The reference SilverMetal flavour. Tier A — full kernel-level hardening, verified boot we control, Debian/Kicksecure-based.

Scope (v1)

See ../docs/roadmap.md Phase 1.

Hardening must-haves

  • Kicksecure base (Debian-derived, hardened upstream)
  • linux-hardened kernel + KSPP sysctl/build flags
  • Secure Boot with our shim/MOK
  • TPM2 PCR-bound LUKS2 unlock (Argon2id), full-disk encryption mandatory
  • AppArmor strict profiles for browsers, mail, viewers, networked daemons
  • GrapheneOS hardened_malloc as system allocator
  • bubblewrap + Flatpak primary; firejail for legacy .deb
  • nftables default-deny inbound, encrypted DNS, SilverVPN always-on default
  • Zero upstream telemetry — verified by integration test
  • SilverBrowser default (ungoogled-chromium-rebranded v1)
  • SilverVPN integrated from existing SilverLABS/SilverVPN (Linux client + tunnel service)
  • SilverSync v1 (Nextcloud-backed, client-side encryption)
  • A/B updates with rollback, signed by our keys
  • Optional amnesic session mode

Out of scope (v1)

  • Atomic / immutable root (v1.1 — ostree experiment)
  • dm-verity on / (v1.1)
  • ARM64 / Apple Silicon (v2)
  • Tor-by-default variant (sibling product later)

Directory layout

linux/
├── build/             # live-build pipeline, reproducible-build config
├── kernel/            # config fragments, linux-hardened pinning
├── overlay/           # /etc + /usr/share/silvermetal + skel hardening overlay
├── packages/
│   ├── include.list   # what's installed
│   └── exclude.list   # what's purged (snap, telemetry, etc.)
├── apparmor/          # custom strict profiles
├── nftables/          # default ruleset
├── installer/         # Calamares branding + hardened defaults
├── update-server/     # signing + repo hosting (infra-as-code)
└── tests/
    ├── lynis-baseline/
    ├── kspp-check/
    └── telemetry-leak/

Verification gates (must pass before public alpha)

  • Two clean builds from same commit → identical SHA256
  • kconfig-hardened-check passes
  • Lynis hardening score ≥ 90
  • 30-min idle telemetry capture: zero packets to MS/Google/Apple/Mozilla/Canonical/Debian/analytics
  • TPM tamper test: LUKS correctly falls back to passphrase
  • AppArmor: every networked binary confined or documented
  • Independent privacy-engineering review

Upstream we depend on

  • Kicksecure — fork base
  • linux-hardened — kernel patchset
  • GrapheneOS hardened_malloc — allocator
  • KSPP — kernel config authority
  • secureblue — reference for v1.1 immutable design
  • SilverLABS/SilverVPN — VPN client + tunnel service (existing, integrated)