SysAdmin
a2bee4b5dc
Run #4274 made progress: identical ISO sizes, identical TOC, identical first 8 KiB — divergence is fully in file payload bytes. But the diagnostic stalled because extract_squashfs() couldn't find the rootfs: diagnose: could not extract squashfs from A diagnose: could not extract squashfs from B Two reasons to address: 1. The named-path probes only checked /live/filesystem.squashfs, /casper/filesystem.squashfs and /filesystem.squashfs. Some live-build configs use /install/... or no canonical name at all. 2. The fallback that used `xorriso -find / -name '*.squashfs'` then piped to `xorriso -extract` didn't work because xorriso's -find output quotes paths, and -extract chokes on quotes. This iteration: * Adds /install/filesystem.squashfs and /boot/filesystem.squashfs to the named-path probes. * Replaces the -find/-name/tail fallback with a generic "biggest file in the ISO" picker. In a live-build ISO the rootfs payload is reliably the largest file regardless of what it's called. Parses lsdl output (with awk, handling spaces in paths and stripping single-quote framing). * On extraction failure, dumps the top 20 files by size to stderr so the workflow log shows what's actually in the ISO — answers "what should the named-path probe match" for the next iter. * Always echoes the first 30 lines of toc-a.txt (and the line count) so we can sanity-check the ISO layout in every run. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SilverMetal OS — Linux
Status: Phase 1 (planning) → moving to milestone 1.1 (reproducible Kicksecure fork build)
🔒 SilverMetal OS product line — we ship the operating system.
The reference SilverMetal flavour. Tier A — full kernel-level hardening, verified boot we control, Debian/Kicksecure-based.
Scope (v1)
See ../docs/roadmap.md Phase 1.
Hardening must-haves
- Kicksecure base (Debian-derived, hardened upstream)
- linux-hardened kernel + KSPP sysctl/build flags
- Secure Boot with our shim/MOK
- TPM2 PCR-bound LUKS2 unlock (Argon2id), full-disk encryption mandatory
- AppArmor strict profiles for browsers, mail, viewers, networked daemons
- GrapheneOS hardened_malloc as system allocator
- bubblewrap + Flatpak primary; firejail for legacy
.deb - nftables default-deny inbound, encrypted DNS, SilverVPN always-on default
- Zero upstream telemetry — verified by integration test
- SilverBrowser default (ungoogled-chromium-rebranded v1)
- SilverVPN integrated from existing
SilverLABS/SilverVPN(Linux client + tunnel service) - SilverSync v1 (Nextcloud-backed, client-side encryption)
- A/B updates with rollback, signed by our keys
- Optional amnesic session mode
Out of scope (v1)
- Atomic / immutable root (v1.1 —
ostreeexperiment) - dm-verity on
/(v1.1) - ARM64 / Apple Silicon (v2)
- Tor-by-default variant (sibling product later)
Directory layout
linux/
├── build/ # live-build pipeline, reproducible-build config
├── kernel/ # config fragments, linux-hardened pinning
├── overlay/ # /etc + /usr/share/silvermetal + skel hardening overlay
├── packages/
│ ├── include.list # what's installed
│ └── exclude.list # what's purged (snap, telemetry, etc.)
├── apparmor/ # custom strict profiles
├── nftables/ # default ruleset
├── installer/ # Calamares branding + hardened defaults
├── update-server/ # signing + repo hosting (infra-as-code)
└── tests/
├── lynis-baseline/
├── kspp-check/
└── telemetry-leak/
Verification gates (must pass before public alpha)
- Two clean builds from same commit → identical SHA256
kconfig-hardened-checkpasses- Lynis hardening score ≥ 90
- 30-min idle telemetry capture: zero packets to MS/Google/Apple/Mozilla/Canonical/Debian/analytics
- TPM tamper test: LUKS correctly falls back to passphrase
- AppArmor: every networked binary confined or documented
- Independent privacy-engineering review
Upstream we depend on
- Kicksecure — fork base
- linux-hardened — kernel patchset
- GrapheneOS hardened_malloc — allocator
- KSPP — kernel config authority
- secureblue — reference for v1.1 immutable design
SilverLABS/SilverVPN— VPN client + tunnel service (existing, integrated)