b1b278bb8d
powershell.exe -File binds a single-quoted comma list like '00','03','05' as ONE string element, not a [string[]] array, so Invoke-Hardening.ps1's -contains filter matched nothing and all hardening modules were silently skipped. Fix: adopt a CSV-split contract — Invoke-Hardening.ps1 now accepts [string]$Modules and splits on ',' internally ($ModuleList = $Modules -split ','); ApplyService passes a bare CSV token (e.g. 00,03,05) with no surrounding quotes. Empirically verified via ProcessStartInfo: candidate (a) '00','03','05' → COUNT=1 (bug); candidate (b) 00,03,05 → single string, correctly split by the script; candidate (c) space-separated → PS positional-parameter error. PARSE OK confirmed. Adds ApplyServiceHardeningIntegrationTests: copies the real Invoke-Hardening.ps1 into a temp dir with harmless dummy 0*.ps1 stubs, runs ApplyService with the real ProcessRunner for modules ["00","05"], and asserts ran.txt contains RAN 00 and RAN 05 but NOT RAN 03 or RAN 07. Test fails on the old encoding and passes with the fix (regression-checked).
SilverMetal Enhanced — Windows
Status: Phase 3W (planning, post-Linux v1)
🛡️ SilverMetal Enhanced product line — we harden Windows in place; we do not ship a custom Windows kernel (Microsoft does not permit that).
Tier C — config-layer hardening only. Honest positioning: we cannot modify the Windows kernel or boot chain; we turn every dial Microsoft exposes.
Scope (v1)
LTSC IoT-based installer that transforms a vanilla Windows install into a SilverMetal-hardened build:
- Windows 11 IoT Enterprise LTSC base (no Cortana, no Store, no Edge baked in, ~10-year support)
- Group Policy hardening (telemetry at
Securityfloor, services disabled, sane defaults) - VBS + HVCI + Credential Guard + Kernel DMA Protection (Microsoft's hardware-backed isolation)
- Defender ASR rules at maximum
- WDAC (App Control for Business) allow-list — kernel-enforced, audit-first then enforce (AppLocker is the documented fallback, not the primary)
- BitLocker enforced — TPM + PIN (never TPM-only; PIN defeats the faulTPM-class offline attack on the AMD fTPM)
- Telemetry suppressed at GP + service + firewall layers (not hosts-file blocking of Microsoft domains — that breaks Windows Update); residual published, not claimed zero
- Edge / Chrome replaced with SilverBrowser default
- Full SilverLABS Stack preinstalled (native Windows builds)
- SilverVPN MAUI Windows client integrated from existing
SilverLABS/SilverVPN
Out of scope
- Anything requiring kernel modifications
- Anything requiring developer-controlled verified boot
- Bypassing Microsoft Update (we ship updates via the same channel; we cannot replace it)
Directory layout
To be populated in Phase 3W. Initial structure planned:
windows/
├── installer/ # PowerShell / WiX-based installer
├── policies/ # Group Policy templates, ADMX
├── wdac/ # WDAC (App Control) policies (AppLocker fallback rules if needed)
├── debloat/ # Removal scripts (Edge, Cortana residue, telemetry)
├── stack-installer/ # Native SilverLABS Stack package builders
└── tests/ # Telemetry-leak test, hardening-baseline test
Verification gates
- Telemetry-leak test on hardened install — minimum-feasible Microsoft contact, documented in full (we cannot reach zero on Windows; we publish what remains)
- BitLocker enabled with TPM + PIN binding verified (TPM-only is rejected)
- VBS / HVCI / Credential Guard verified running
- WDAC allow-list functional (enforced) and documented
- Stack apps install and function
Full hardening specification
The detailed control spec — eight control domains, verification commands, residual-risk statement, and productization notes — lives in hardening-spec.md. Reference device: GPD Pocket 4 (AMD Strix Point).
Upstream we depend on
- Windows 11 IoT Enterprise LTSC — base OS (licensed)
- AtlasOS / ReviOS / privacy.sexy — reference for hardening configs
- Chris Titus Tech / O&O ShutUp10 — reference for telemetry blocking
SilverLABS/SilverVPN— MAUI Windows client (existing)