Files
SilverMetal/linux
SysAdmin bf55a3f81c
Some checks failed
Build SilverMetal Linux ISO (reproducibility-gated) / build-and-verify (push) Failing after 1m14s
fix(linux/build): mark build-inner.sh executable (M1.1)
Run #4252 died at:

    runuser: failed to execute /workspace/SilverLABS/SilverMetal/linux/build/scripts/build-inner.sh:
    Permission denied

The script was created on the WSL/Windows side (/mnt/c) where every
file appears world-rwx regardless of git's index, so the local
`chmod +x` was a no-op as far as git was concerned and the file got
committed at mode 100644 like any other regular file. Sibling scripts
(build.sh, verify-reproducibility.sh, diagnose-divergence.sh) all
correctly carry 100755 in the index.

Fix: `git update-index --chmod=+x` to set the bit in the index
explicitly, independent of the working-tree perms.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 11:13:02 +01:00
..

SilverMetal OS — Linux

Status: Phase 1 (planning) → moving to milestone 1.1 (reproducible Kicksecure fork build)

🔒 SilverMetal OS product line — we ship the operating system.

The reference SilverMetal flavour. Tier A — full kernel-level hardening, verified boot we control, Debian/Kicksecure-based.

Scope (v1)

See ../docs/roadmap.md Phase 1.

Hardening must-haves

  • Kicksecure base (Debian-derived, hardened upstream)
  • linux-hardened kernel + KSPP sysctl/build flags
  • Secure Boot with our shim/MOK
  • TPM2 PCR-bound LUKS2 unlock (Argon2id), full-disk encryption mandatory
  • AppArmor strict profiles for browsers, mail, viewers, networked daemons
  • GrapheneOS hardened_malloc as system allocator
  • bubblewrap + Flatpak primary; firejail for legacy .deb
  • nftables default-deny inbound, encrypted DNS, SilverVPN always-on default
  • Zero upstream telemetry — verified by integration test
  • SilverBrowser default (ungoogled-chromium-rebranded v1)
  • SilverVPN integrated from existing SilverLABS/SilverVPN (Linux client + tunnel service)
  • SilverSync v1 (Nextcloud-backed, client-side encryption)
  • A/B updates with rollback, signed by our keys
  • Optional amnesic session mode

Out of scope (v1)

  • Atomic / immutable root (v1.1 — ostree experiment)
  • dm-verity on / (v1.1)
  • ARM64 / Apple Silicon (v2)
  • Tor-by-default variant (sibling product later)

Directory layout

linux/
├── build/             # live-build pipeline, reproducible-build config
├── kernel/            # config fragments, linux-hardened pinning
├── overlay/           # /etc + /usr/share/silvermetal + skel hardening overlay
├── packages/
│   ├── include.list   # what's installed
│   └── exclude.list   # what's purged (snap, telemetry, etc.)
├── apparmor/          # custom strict profiles
├── nftables/          # default ruleset
├── installer/         # Calamares branding + hardened defaults
├── update-server/     # signing + repo hosting (infra-as-code)
└── tests/
    ├── lynis-baseline/
    ├── kspp-check/
    └── telemetry-leak/

Verification gates (must pass before public alpha)

  • Two clean builds from same commit → identical SHA256
  • kconfig-hardened-check passes
  • Lynis hardening score ≥ 90
  • 30-min idle telemetry capture: zero packets to MS/Google/Apple/Mozilla/Canonical/Debian/analytics
  • TPM tamper test: LUKS correctly falls back to passphrase
  • AppArmor: every networked binary confined or documented
  • Independent privacy-engineering review

Upstream we depend on

  • Kicksecure — fork base
  • linux-hardened — kernel patchset
  • GrapheneOS hardened_malloc — allocator
  • KSPP — kernel config authority
  • secureblue — reference for v1.1 immutable design
  • SilverLABS/SilverVPN — VPN client + tunnel service (existing, integrated)