SysAdmin
c9e67d8b47
Run #4273 confirmed two things: 1. The reproducibility gate works end-to-end. Both builds produced ISOs (1077194752 vs 1077202944 bytes — 8 KiB delta, exactly one squashfs block worth of compressed-payload drift) and the compare step caught it. 2. diffoscope, run on the whole 1 GB ISO inside the silvermetal-builder container, gets OOM-killed before producing any output: diagnose-divergence.sh: line 44: 13 Killed diffoscope --max-report-size 100000000 --html ... --text ... A.iso B.iso The host has 19 GiB free, but diffoscope's full recursion through ISO -> squashfs -> ~thousands of inner files needs more memory than that for a 1 GB image. Setting --max-report-size only caps the output, not the working-set. Rewrite diagnose-divergence.sh to do staged, cheap-to-expensive analysis: 1. sha256 + sizes (always) 2. xorriso TOC of both ISOs (every node: mode/size/mtime/path) -> diff 3. Pull just live/filesystem.squashfs out of each ISO, sha256 it + `unsquashfs -ll` it, diff the listings — this is where the per-file-size signal lives. 4. Targeted diffoscope on the squashfs payload only, with --max-container-depth 2 + --max-text-report-size 5MB + --no-html + a 10-minute timeout. Bounded enough to finish without the OOM. Drops `set -e` — every step `|| true`s itself so we get partial output even when one stage fails. Workflow tail-into-log step now prints the new staged outputs: * toc-diff.txt — what changed at the ISO level * sqfs-ls-diff.txt — which inner files have different sizes/mtimes * sqfs-diff.txt — diffoscope on the squashfs only * squashfs-sha256.txt * iso-header-cmp.txt — first-8KB cmp -l for header-level drift * sizes.txt / sha256.txt / checklist.md as before Should land us a focused list of "these N files inside the squashfs have different bytes" — that's what we need to find what's leaking non-determinism into the build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SilverMetal OS — Linux
Status: Phase 1 (planning) → moving to milestone 1.1 (reproducible Kicksecure fork build)
🔒 SilverMetal OS product line — we ship the operating system.
The reference SilverMetal flavour. Tier A — full kernel-level hardening, verified boot we control, Debian/Kicksecure-based.
Scope (v1)
See ../docs/roadmap.md Phase 1.
Hardening must-haves
- Kicksecure base (Debian-derived, hardened upstream)
- linux-hardened kernel + KSPP sysctl/build flags
- Secure Boot with our shim/MOK
- TPM2 PCR-bound LUKS2 unlock (Argon2id), full-disk encryption mandatory
- AppArmor strict profiles for browsers, mail, viewers, networked daemons
- GrapheneOS hardened_malloc as system allocator
- bubblewrap + Flatpak primary; firejail for legacy
.deb - nftables default-deny inbound, encrypted DNS, SilverVPN always-on default
- Zero upstream telemetry — verified by integration test
- SilverBrowser default (ungoogled-chromium-rebranded v1)
- SilverVPN integrated from existing
SilverLABS/SilverVPN(Linux client + tunnel service) - SilverSync v1 (Nextcloud-backed, client-side encryption)
- A/B updates with rollback, signed by our keys
- Optional amnesic session mode
Out of scope (v1)
- Atomic / immutable root (v1.1 —
ostreeexperiment) - dm-verity on
/(v1.1) - ARM64 / Apple Silicon (v2)
- Tor-by-default variant (sibling product later)
Directory layout
linux/
├── build/ # live-build pipeline, reproducible-build config
├── kernel/ # config fragments, linux-hardened pinning
├── overlay/ # /etc + /usr/share/silvermetal + skel hardening overlay
├── packages/
│ ├── include.list # what's installed
│ └── exclude.list # what's purged (snap, telemetry, etc.)
├── apparmor/ # custom strict profiles
├── nftables/ # default ruleset
├── installer/ # Calamares branding + hardened defaults
├── update-server/ # signing + repo hosting (infra-as-code)
└── tests/
├── lynis-baseline/
├── kspp-check/
└── telemetry-leak/
Verification gates (must pass before public alpha)
- Two clean builds from same commit → identical SHA256
kconfig-hardened-checkpasses- Lynis hardening score ≥ 90
- 30-min idle telemetry capture: zero packets to MS/Google/Apple/Mozilla/Canonical/Debian/analytics
- TPM tamper test: LUKS correctly falls back to passphrase
- AppArmor: every networked binary confined or documented
- Independent privacy-engineering review
Upstream we depend on
- Kicksecure — fork base
- linux-hardened — kernel patchset
- GrapheneOS hardened_malloc — allocator
- KSPP — kernel config authority
- secureblue — reference for v1.1 immutable design
SilverLABS/SilverVPN— VPN client + tunnel service (existing, integrated)