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SysAdmin 7d5f9cc246 chore(scaffold): initial SilverMetal program scaffold

Cross-platform privacy-hardening program. Two-layer product:
- SilverLABS Application Stack (cross-platform spine)
- Platform Hardening Profiles (per-OS, tier-honest)

Platforms: Linux (Debian/Kicksecure), Android (Pixel/Samsung/Moto/generic),
Windows (LTSC IoT), macOS (profile), iOS (MDM profile). Each flavour has
both a preflashed hardware SKU path and a self-apply "harden your existing
device" path.

Includes umbrella docs (README + threat-model, design-principles,
platform-matrix, roadmap, trust-model), per-platform and per-stack-
component README stubs, .gitignore, LICENSE.

Linux v1 ships first; Stack v1 = Browser + VPN + Sync.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-04-25 03:11:48 +01:00

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SilverMetal Linux

Status: Phase 1 (planning) → moving to milestone 1.1 (reproducible Kicksecure fork build)

The reference SilverMetal flavour. Tier A — full kernel-level hardening, verified boot we control, Debian/Kicksecure-based.

Scope (v1)

See ../docs/roadmap.md Phase 1.

Hardening must-haves

Kicksecure base (Debian-derived, hardened upstream)
linux-hardened kernel + KSPP sysctl/build flags
Secure Boot with our shim/MOK
TPM2 PCR-bound LUKS2 unlock (Argon2id), full-disk encryption mandatory
AppArmor strict profiles for browsers, mail, viewers, networked daemons
GrapheneOS hardened_malloc as system allocator
bubblewrap + Flatpak primary; firejail for legacy .deb
nftables default-deny inbound, encrypted DNS, SilverVPN always-on default
Zero upstream telemetry — verified by integration test
SilverBrowser default (ungoogled-chromium-rebranded v1)
A/B updates with rollback, signed by our keys
Optional amnesic session mode

Out of scope (v1)

Atomic / immutable root (v1.1 — ostree experiment)
dm-verity on / (v1.1)
ARM64 / Apple Silicon (v2)
Tor-by-default variant (sibling product later)

Directory layout

linux/
├── build/             # live-build pipeline, reproducible-build config
├── kernel/            # config fragments, linux-hardened pinning
├── overlay/           # /etc + /usr/share/silvermetal + skel hardening overlay
├── packages/
│   ├── include.list   # what's installed
│   └── exclude.list   # what's purged (snap, telemetry, etc.)
├── apparmor/          # custom strict profiles
├── nftables/          # default ruleset
├── installer/         # Calamares branding + hardened defaults
├── update-server/     # signing + repo hosting (infra-as-code)
└── tests/
    ├── lynis-baseline/
    ├── kspp-check/
    └── telemetry-leak/

Verification gates (must pass before public alpha)

Two clean builds from same commit → identical SHA256
kconfig-hardened-check passes
Lynis hardening score ≥ 90
30-min idle telemetry capture: zero packets to MS/Google/Apple/Mozilla/Canonical/Debian/analytics
TPM tamper test: LUKS correctly falls back to passphrase
AppArmor: every networked binary confined or documented
Independent privacy-engineering review

Upstream we depend on

Kicksecure — fork base
linux-hardened — kernel patchset
GrapheneOS hardened_malloc — allocator
KSPP — kernel config authority
secureblue — reference for v1.1 immutable design

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