Files
SilverMetal/linux/README.md
SysAdmin 0a0075ce66 docs(naming): adopt OS / Enhanced product-line framing + align with existing repos
Two product lines, named to make scope obvious to buyers:
- 🔒 SilverMetal OS — we ship the operating system or ROM
  (Linux, Pixel, Samsung-unlocked, Motorola-unlocked)
- 🛡️ SilverMetal Enhanced — we harden the OS the device already runs
  (Windows, macOS, iOS, generic Android)

Repo alignment:
- SilverVPN already exists as a SilverLABS product (server + MAUI client +
  Linux client + tunnel service). stack/vpn/ is now an integration pointer
  rather than a re-scaffold; per-platform READMEs reference it.
- SilverApple is deprecated; SilverMetal Enhanced — iOS supersedes it.
  Migration step added as roadmap milestone 3I.1.
- SilverDROID name clash explicitly noted as unrelated (it's the SilverSHELL
  AppStore Android client, not an Android ROM).
- SilverChat may overlap with SilverVPN.Client.Chat; alignment decision
  added as roadmap milestone 1.1.1.

Roadmap restructured: phases now track the OS/Enhanced split.
Platform matrix re-sectioned and decision flowchart updated.
README rewritten around the two-product-line framing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-25 03:30:45 +01:00

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2.9 KiB
Markdown

# SilverMetal OS — Linux
**Status**: Phase 1 (planning) → moving to milestone 1.1 (reproducible Kicksecure fork build)
🔒 **SilverMetal OS product line** — we ship the operating system.
The reference SilverMetal flavour. Tier A — full kernel-level hardening, verified boot we control, Debian/Kicksecure-based.
## Scope (v1)
See [`../docs/roadmap.md`](../docs/roadmap.md) Phase 1.
### Hardening must-haves
- Kicksecure base (Debian-derived, hardened upstream)
- linux-hardened kernel + KSPP sysctl/build flags
- Secure Boot with our shim/MOK
- TPM2 PCR-bound LUKS2 unlock (Argon2id), full-disk encryption mandatory
- AppArmor strict profiles for browsers, mail, viewers, networked daemons
- GrapheneOS hardened_malloc as system allocator
- bubblewrap + Flatpak primary; firejail for legacy `.deb`
- nftables default-deny inbound, encrypted DNS, SilverVPN always-on default
- Zero upstream telemetry — verified by integration test
- SilverBrowser default (ungoogled-chromium-rebranded v1)
- SilverVPN integrated from existing [`SilverLABS/SilverVPN`](https://git.silverlabs.uk/SilverLABS/SilverVPN) (Linux client + tunnel service)
- SilverSync v1 (Nextcloud-backed, client-side encryption)
- A/B updates with rollback, signed by our keys
- Optional amnesic session mode
### Out of scope (v1)
- Atomic / immutable root (v1.1 — `ostree` experiment)
- dm-verity on `/` (v1.1)
- ARM64 / Apple Silicon (v2)
- Tor-by-default variant (sibling product later)
## Directory layout
```
linux/
├── build/ # live-build pipeline, reproducible-build config
├── kernel/ # config fragments, linux-hardened pinning
├── overlay/ # /etc + /usr/share/silvermetal + skel hardening overlay
├── packages/
│ ├── include.list # what's installed
│ └── exclude.list # what's purged (snap, telemetry, etc.)
├── apparmor/ # custom strict profiles
├── nftables/ # default ruleset
├── installer/ # Calamares branding + hardened defaults
├── update-server/ # signing + repo hosting (infra-as-code)
└── tests/
├── lynis-baseline/
├── kspp-check/
└── telemetry-leak/
```
## Verification gates (must pass before public alpha)
- Two clean builds from same commit → identical SHA256
- `kconfig-hardened-check` passes
- Lynis hardening score ≥ 90
- 30-min idle telemetry capture: zero packets to MS/Google/Apple/Mozilla/Canonical/Debian/analytics
- TPM tamper test: LUKS correctly falls back to passphrase
- AppArmor: every networked binary confined or documented
- Independent privacy-engineering review
## Upstream we depend on
- **Kicksecure** — fork base
- **linux-hardened** — kernel patchset
- **GrapheneOS hardened_malloc** — allocator
- **KSPP** — kernel config authority
- **secureblue** — reference for v1.1 immutable design
- **`SilverLABS/SilverVPN`** — VPN client + tunnel service (existing, integrated)