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Build SilverMetal Enhanced - Windows ISO / build (pull_request) Successful in 5m37s
VM e2e findings on the real-user desktop: 1. Lock/login screen + wallpaper NOT branded (OEM About WAS) — Windows resets the offline-baked personalization (PersonalizationCSP / default-user wallpaper / FVE) during OOBE, same class as the UAC reset. Fix: stage windows/branding/ into the image and re-run Apply-Branding -Mode Online from SetupComplete (post-OOBE, as SYSTEM) where it sticks. OEM About re-asserted harmlessly. 2. sm-bootstrap account still present after onboarding — TearDownAsync's in-session Remove-LocalUser no-ops (can't delete the account you're logged in as). Fix: keep the best-effort in-session attempt, but DEFER the real removal to a SYSTEM AtStartup scheduled task that runs on next boot (sm-bootstrap not logged on), removes the account + Win32_UserProfile, then deletes itself. (Network 'no adapter' in the VM was a Proxmox NIC-model regression to virtio — fixed by switching the VM to Intel e1000; not a SilverMetal change.) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
SilverMetal Enhanced — Windows
Status: Phase 3W (planning, post-Linux v1)
🛡️ SilverMetal Enhanced product line — we harden Windows in place; we do not ship a custom Windows kernel (Microsoft does not permit that).
Tier C — config-layer hardening only. Honest positioning: we cannot modify the Windows kernel or boot chain; we turn every dial Microsoft exposes.
Scope (v1)
LTSC IoT-based installer that transforms a vanilla Windows install into a SilverMetal-hardened build:
- Windows 11 IoT Enterprise LTSC base (no Cortana, no Store, no Edge baked in, ~10-year support)
- Group Policy hardening (telemetry at
Securityfloor, services disabled, sane defaults) - VBS + HVCI + Credential Guard + Kernel DMA Protection (Microsoft's hardware-backed isolation)
- Defender ASR rules at maximum
- WDAC (App Control for Business) allow-list — kernel-enforced, audit-first then enforce (AppLocker is the documented fallback, not the primary)
- BitLocker enforced — TPM + PIN (never TPM-only; PIN defeats the faulTPM-class offline attack on the AMD fTPM)
- Telemetry suppressed at GP + service + firewall layers (not hosts-file blocking of Microsoft domains — that breaks Windows Update); residual published, not claimed zero
- Edge / Chrome replaced with SilverBrowser default
- Full SilverLABS Stack preinstalled (native Windows builds)
- SilverVPN MAUI Windows client integrated from existing
SilverLABS/SilverVPN
Out of scope
- Anything requiring kernel modifications
- Anything requiring developer-controlled verified boot
- Bypassing Microsoft Update (we ship updates via the same channel; we cannot replace it)
Directory layout
To be populated in Phase 3W. Initial structure planned:
windows/
├── installer/ # PowerShell / WiX-based installer
├── policies/ # Group Policy templates, ADMX
├── wdac/ # WDAC (App Control) policies (AppLocker fallback rules if needed)
├── debloat/ # Removal scripts (Edge, Cortana residue, telemetry)
├── stack-installer/ # Native SilverLABS Stack package builders
└── tests/ # Telemetry-leak test, hardening-baseline test
Verification gates
- Telemetry-leak test on hardened install — minimum-feasible Microsoft contact, documented in full (we cannot reach zero on Windows; we publish what remains)
- BitLocker enabled with TPM + PIN binding verified (TPM-only is rejected)
- VBS / HVCI / Credential Guard verified running
- WDAC allow-list functional (enforced) and documented
- Stack apps install and function
Full hardening specification
The detailed control spec — eight control domains, verification commands, residual-risk statement, and productization notes — lives in hardening-spec.md. Reference device: GPD Pocket 4 (AMD Strix Point).
Upstream we depend on
- Windows 11 IoT Enterprise LTSC — base OS (licensed)
- AtlasOS / ReviOS / privacy.sexy — reference for hardening configs
- Chris Titus Tech / O&O ShutUp10 — reference for telemetry blocking
SilverLABS/SilverVPN— MAUI Windows client (existing)