Add windows/hardening-spec.md: the detailed config-layer hardening spec for SilverMetal Enhanced - Windows, with the GPD Pocket 4 (AMD Strix Point) as reference device. Eight control domains (provisioning, boot/firmware trust, data-at-rest, kernel/credential isolation, app control, network/radios, physical/lock-screen, privacy/update) each with verification commands, a buyer-facing residual-risk statement, and one-off -> SKU productization notes. Refine the windows/README.md v1 scope to match, grounded in the 2026-06-08 deep-research assessment: - BitLocker TPM+PIN (never TPM-only) - PIN defeats the faulTPM-class offline fTPM attack that is literally a BitLocker VMK extraction - WDAC (App Control), kernel-enforced, audit-first then enforce, as primary; AppLocker demoted to fallback (rename planned applocker/ -> wdac/) - Telemetry at GP+service+firewall layers, NOT hosts-file blocking of MS domains (that breaks Windows Update; violates "update or die") - Add VBS/HVCI/Credential Guard/Kernel DMA Protection to scope + verify gates - Note Enterprise (prototype) vs IoT Enterprise LTSC (SKU target) equivalence Bound by docs/threat-model.md and docs/design-principles.md; nation-state / firmware tier explicitly NOT claimed on consumer UMPC silicon. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
62 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
62 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
# SilverMetal Enhanced — Windows
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**Status**: Phase 3W (planning, post-Linux v1)
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🛡️ **SilverMetal Enhanced product line** — we harden Windows in place; we do not ship a custom Windows kernel (Microsoft does not permit that).
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Tier C — config-layer hardening only. Honest positioning: we cannot modify the Windows kernel or boot chain; we turn every dial Microsoft exposes.
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## Scope (v1)
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LTSC IoT-based installer that transforms a vanilla Windows install into a SilverMetal-hardened build:
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- Windows 11 IoT Enterprise LTSC base (no Cortana, no Store, no Edge baked in, ~10-year support)
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- Group Policy hardening (telemetry at `Security` floor, services disabled, sane defaults)
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- VBS + HVCI + Credential Guard + Kernel DMA Protection (Microsoft's hardware-backed isolation)
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- Defender ASR rules at maximum
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- WDAC (App Control for Business) allow-list — kernel-enforced, audit-first then enforce (AppLocker is the documented fallback, not the primary)
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- BitLocker enforced — **TPM + PIN** (never TPM-only; PIN defeats the faulTPM-class offline attack on the AMD fTPM)
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- Telemetry suppressed at GP + service + firewall layers (**not** hosts-file blocking of Microsoft domains — that breaks Windows Update); residual published, not claimed zero
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- Edge / Chrome replaced with SilverBrowser default
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- Full SilverLABS Stack preinstalled (native Windows builds)
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- SilverVPN MAUI Windows client integrated from existing [`SilverLABS/SilverVPN`](https://git.silverlabs.uk/SilverLABS/SilverVPN)
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## Out of scope
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- Anything requiring kernel modifications
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- Anything requiring developer-controlled verified boot
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- Bypassing Microsoft Update (we ship updates via the same channel; we cannot replace it)
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## Directory layout
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To be populated in Phase 3W. Initial structure planned:
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```
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windows/
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├── installer/ # PowerShell / WiX-based installer
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├── policies/ # Group Policy templates, ADMX
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├── wdac/ # WDAC (App Control) policies (AppLocker fallback rules if needed)
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├── debloat/ # Removal scripts (Edge, Cortana residue, telemetry)
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├── stack-installer/ # Native SilverLABS Stack package builders
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└── tests/ # Telemetry-leak test, hardening-baseline test
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```
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## Verification gates
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- Telemetry-leak test on hardened install — minimum-feasible Microsoft contact, *documented in full* (we cannot reach zero on Windows; we publish what remains)
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- BitLocker enabled with **TPM + PIN** binding verified (TPM-only is rejected)
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- VBS / HVCI / Credential Guard verified running
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- WDAC allow-list functional (enforced) and documented
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- Stack apps install and function
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## Full hardening specification
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The detailed control spec — eight control domains, verification commands, residual-risk statement, and productization notes — lives in [`hardening-spec.md`](hardening-spec.md). Reference device: GPD Pocket 4 (AMD Strix Point).
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## Upstream we depend on
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- **Windows 11 IoT Enterprise LTSC** — base OS (licensed)
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- **AtlasOS / ReviOS / privacy.sexy** — reference for hardening configs
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- **Chris Titus Tech / O&O ShutUp10** — reference for telemetry blocking
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- **`SilverLABS/SilverVPN`** — MAUI Windows client (existing)
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